Question 1

Our robots are secure-by-design. Do we still need extra protection?

Accepted Answer

Secure-by-design is the right foundation, but it's not the finish line. Traditional design reviews often miss risks in the AI layer, connectivity, and third-party software supply chain. Threats such as model manipulation, third-party software vulnerabilities, or sensor hijacking can bypass static design safeguards. Continuous runtime monitoring, OTA signature verification, and AI-model integrity checks are now essential to keep robots safe and compliant in the field.

Question 2

If our robots have limited compute, isn't it hard for attackers to replace their AI models?

Accepted Answer

Attackers don't need a smarter model, just a more purpose-driven one. An attack model only needs to perform a specific task, such as manipulating commands, altering sensor inputs, or opening unauthorized connections, which makes it lightweight and resource-efficient. That's why we emphasize integrity protection for the AI model loading and runtime stages, not just hardware security.

Question 3

We're shipping robots globally. How do cybersecurity standards differ by region?

Accepted Answer

EU links product safety with long-term software accountability (CRA; full application by Dec 11, 2027) and applies a risk-based AI Act for high-risk AI systems. US emphasizes market transparency and procurement readiness (NIST frameworks, SBOM disclosure, and the voluntary IoT Cyber Trust Mark labeling). China ties cybersecurity to data sovereignty (CSL/DSL/PIPL, MLPS 2.0), and adds a service-robot baseline GB/T 45502-2025 (effective Oct 1, 2025).

Question 4

We don't have a dedicated security team. Where should we start?

Accepted Answer

Start with risk visibility. Our One-Stop Security Scanning Platform reveals hidden system and AI vulnerabilities, so you know where to act first. It's the most strategic way to begin your security journey, by turning visibility into action and action into continuous protection.

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